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The Geopolitics of
Mediterranean
Security: Assessing
Regional Threats in
Middle East and
North Africa (MENA)
in the Post-Arab
Spring

by

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On the cover: Donald Tusk, President of the European Council (second from right) and Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission (third from right), meet Barack Obama, U.S. President (third from left) for an EU-US leaders meeting on 8 July 2016 to discuss common political, economic and international security challenges. Source: European Union.

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THE GEOPOLITICS OF MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING

This paper examines contrasting views on the geopolitical effects of the post-Arab Spring. Assessing Middle Eastern, U.S., and European perspectives on transnational security issues includes those threats that directly influence the roles and missions of U.S. special operations forces (SOF). These geopolitical security issues require continuing attention to significant events, such as the fall of authoritarian regimes and the impact on public services, economies, and human, state, and regional security; the dynamics of regional geopolitics; and the push-pull forces of globalization.

The context of time and space, in renewing an emphasis on geopolitics, has significant implications for regional studies, including the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as well as Southern and Eastern Europe. The findings here are intended to assist the SOF and wider defense community in thinking about how these political revolutions influence the geopolitical-military assessments at the regional and national levels, as well as at the operational levels of policy and strategy.

This analysis begins by focusing on the outward-directed threats in the Middle East and North Africa, including the use of force, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, as well as human security issues, such as illegal immigration, refugees, and violence against noncombatants, especially women and children. A starting assumption is that there is a continuing gap between the academic and practitioner ideas, approaches, and forecasts. The “intellectual anchor” for this part of the study is the notion that responding to outward-directed threats, as the external determinants of grand strategy, requires thoughtful analysis and judgment.¹

Sound strategies should also seek to address the gaps that exist among scholars and practitioners. For instance, in his literature review essay of the big ideas on post-Cold War international relations by scholars Samuel P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and John J. Mearsheimer, security studies professor and former practitioner Richard Betts gets to the essence of the theory-practice divide. While emphasizing the need for ideas for informed policy and decision-making, Betts writes that:

Reminders of the limits of theory ring true to practical people. But if causes and effects are hopelessly random, then there is no hope for informed policy. Terminal

¹ For a fuller discussion of ‘threat’ as an external determinant (along with considerations of geography and technology) for designing strategy, see Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 64.

uncertainty, however, is not an option for statesmen. They cannot just take shots in the dark, so they cannot do without some assumptions about how the world works. This is why practical people are slaves of defunct economists or contemporary political theorists. Policymakers need intellectual anchors if they are to make informed decisions that are any more likely to move the world in the right direction than the wrong one.²

In addition, the internal threats, such as the inability to address political conflict and enable non-violent transitions between regimes, from Iraq to Libya to Egypt to Syria, should cause Middle Eastern, European, U.S., and international scholars and diplomats to pause and consider alternative approaches. The calls for the U.S. to adapt hard power diplomacy and defense capabilities were answered to a certain extent in the policy statements of the Obama presidential administration as well as European Union officials. However, in recognition of the flaws in the founding and development of the Arab states, this section examines problems being faced today in terms of the threats to economic and political development, institution and state building, rule of law and reconciliation, governance and civil society.

For the West—the United States and the European Union—with their guiding democratic traditions and institutions, there are further questions. For instance, can the Western response to the threats of Middle Eastern political instability and disorder provide the means to influence efforts at MENA state building in influencing, in positive directions, both state capacity and political legitimacy? Or is the nature of the threats such that there is no viable alternative to the ascendance of autocratic governments? Are there convincing arguments for favoring stability and security over meaningful reforms that include the rule of law, civil society, and legitimate governance?

Mediterranean Regional Threats Since the 2011 Arab Spring: U.S. Perspectives

The main areas for defining the nature of critical threats in the post–Arab Spring Mediterranean region include the conventional use of force, the expansion of terrorist violence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and human security. The U.S. government’s threat perceptions are readily available in open source unclassified documents. For instance, U.S. regional perspectives on Middle East and North Africa threats are highlighted publicly in official documents published by the Director of National Intelligence and available over the Internet.³ The

² Richard K. Betts, “Conflict or Cooperation?,” in *The Clash at 20: What did Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations?” get right and wrong, and how does it look two decades later?*, ed. Gideon Rose, anthology, *Foreign Affairs* (2013), 79.

³ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee,” 26 February 2015. This document’s beginning section categorizes global threats in terms of: cyber, counterintelligence, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation, space and counter-space, transnational organized crime, economics and natural resources, and human security.

section on regional threats includes a listing by country, but does not include an overall regional analysis. In terms of the use of force in the region, it is extraordinary to consider how many wars are ongoing. Conventional, unconventional, and now hybrid conflicts, including potential interstate wars and civil wars, threaten regional as well as global stability.

It is difficult to think of a period of post–World War II history when any region has experienced such extensive warfare, except possibly for Southeast Asia during the U.S.’s 25-year involvement in Vietnam.⁴ Currently Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen are all engaged in open warfare. A Brookings Institution study points out that Syria is more than “just a civil war” and is now the “central battle in the conflict over a new order in the Middle East.”⁵ The long-term human cost continues to raise international attention, but so far has failed to stop the horrific violence. The ramifications of the Syrian civil war, usually characterized as a power struggle between the pro-regime and anti-Assad forces, goes well beyond the internal dynamics to include both regional and great power implications.⁶

In Iraq, there are currently ‘lines’ of territorial control between Iraqi forces and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).⁷ Military forces, with army ground forces and militias supported by air forces and artillery weapons, are competing for territory in Iraq and Syria in conventional ways that would be familiar to all who have studied warfare. ISIL proclaims its intent to expand into the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, and challenges both modern Middle Eastern regimes as well as western interests. In Libya, rival militias are fighting a civil war that has fractured the political environment and the potential to form a unity government.⁸ The ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq among the Sunni and Shi’a forces is replicated in Yemen with the Shi’a Huthi battling al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as Saudi Arabia and its emerging coalition in the Arabian Peninsula.

Participating in the use of force in each of these conflicts are the U.S. and Iran. The Iranian support to Baghdad and Damascus includes arms, advisers, funds, and direct combat support.⁹ The role of Iran as a patron state adds capabilities to the engaged conventional forces as well as the various terrorist groups. The extent to which Iran will be willing to provide, or in some cases expand, advanced military weaponry, advice, and training to the conflicting parties will remain threatening to the region. Examples of the potential for arms transfers would include Iranian sophisticated long-range missiles that U.S. intelligence claims have the range to strike as far away

⁴ George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill College, 2001).

⁵ *Big Bets, Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book*, (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014), 21.

⁶ For a thoughtful critique of the potential for the use of force in Syria, see Clark A. Murdock, “What Has Syria Taught Us About the Right Time to Use Force?” in *2014 Global Forecast: U.S. Security Policy at a Crossroads*, Craig Cohen, Kathleen Hicks, and Josiane Gabel, Eds. (Center for Strategic & International Studies, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013).

⁷ In this paper, ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) are used synonymously.

⁸ Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

as Southeastern Europe.¹⁰ The growing Iranian expertise in training Arab forces in counterinsurgency, and conventional and hybrid warfare, all widens the opportunities to escalate regional warfare horizontally and vertically.

The threat of terrorism continues to spread in a variety of patterns. For instance, the morphing of ISIL into a force that can control large areas inside of and between nation-states for an extended time is a relatively new phenomenon in the post–Cold War era. Add to that the extensive threat of ISIL-trained and now battle-experienced European and North American individuals providing additional gateways to spread terrorism inside of Western countries. Other complicating patterns include the new inroads into Lebanon by the Sunni Al Nusra Front and ISIL, in partnership, in fighting against the Lebanese Army and the Iranian-backed Shi'a Hezbollah. The Syria-Lebanon border area remains an ungovernable space and an area that can serve as an effective terrorist base.

The Egyptian Sinai is another example of the growing capacity of terrorist groups to find bases in remote areas. Since the Arab Spring, and markedly since 2013, the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) group has become affiliated with ISIL. The ABM terrorists now claim “responsibility for some of the most sophisticated and deadly attacks against Egyptian security forces in decades.”¹¹ The expansion and deadliness of these terrorist groups is likely to grow without effective and sustained counterterrorist training, doctrine, and operations conducted by a powerful, unified state with a skilled, professional military.

The 2015 announcement of the U.S. renewing \$1.3 billion in annual military aid to the Egyptian government under President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi is intended to meet the “strategic objectives of both countries in combating terrorism and extremism and maintaining security,” particularly in Egypt’s restive Sinai Peninsula.¹² This U.S. decision is noteworthy in that reports indicate the Obama Administration withdrew its earlier certification requirement that Sissi’s government “made advances in democracy, human rights and rule of law.”¹³ It is also noteworthy that the aid consists of conventional arms, including orders for 12 F-16 jet aircraft, 20 missiles, and 125 M1A1 Abrams tank kits. Nevertheless, the National Security Council spokeswoman, Bernadette Meehan, stated specifically that the aid is intended for a “secure and stable Egypt and the defeat of terrorist organizations.”¹⁴ While the press releases from both the U.S. and Egypt stress concerns about “upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms,” the continuing concerns about human rights and political freedoms in Egypt and for building international and internal perceptions of Sissi’s legitimacy will remain a work in progress for the immediate future.¹⁵

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 16.

¹² Associated Press, “US Military Aid Released to Egypt Boosts Leader’s Legitimacy,” *The New York Times*, 1 April 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/04/01/world/middleeast/ap-ml-egypt-us.html?_r=0.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Reuters, “White House lifts hold on military aid to Egypt,” 31 March 2015, available at: www.jpost.com/Middle-East/White-House-lifts-hold-on-military-aid-to-Egypt-395760.

¹⁵ Associated Press, “US Military Aid Released to Egypt Boosts Leader’s Legitimacy.”

George Washington University Professor Amitai Etzioni's ideas regarding the principle of security as a higher priority than democratization provides a logic for understanding the U.S. position with respect to Egypt and other Middle Eastern regimes.¹⁶ Bluntly stated, Etzioni's proposition is that security must be a higher priority than democratic governance. "In short," Etzioni summarizes that, "moral arguments and empirical evidence support the same proposition: in circumstances under which a full spectrum of rights cannot be advanced simultaneously—a common situation—basic security must lead."¹⁷ From a practitioner's perspective, longtime U.S. diplomat and career Ambassador Frank Wisner echoes Etzioni's ideas regarding the need for rethinking the past decade of American policy errors in using abstract goals, such as democratization, as a framework for defining U.S. national interests in the Middle East. These views would accommodate the Obama administration's compromise and relative backtracking from its earlier position.

Etzioni is pessimistic about the prevention of what he terms "small-scale terrorism" and encourages differentiating between small-scale and "massive terrorism, which involves WMD (weapons of mass destruction)."¹⁸ In his concluding chapter, Etzioni recommends "A Distinct Approach: Deproliferation" with six specific policy recommendations: upgrading security at nuclear arms and fissile materials storage facilities temporarily until these materials can be blended down or dismantled; expropriating fissile materials to safe havens and blending them down in safe havens; replacing all HEU [highly enriched uranium] with LEU [low enriched uranium], which in effect cannot be used in making bombs; preventing transnational trade and transportation of nuclear bombs and materials; preventing the construction of new facilities that use HEU; and offering role states non-aggression treaties and arrangements for giving up their nuclear arms programs.¹⁹ As Etzioni acknowledges, these recommendations require major efforts by the nuclear nations and regional powers that include the gradual shift of prevailing norms, economic resources, and political capital.

¹⁶ Amitai Etzioni, *Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). Also see Ambassador Frank Wisner, "U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis," UC Berkeley Events, Institute of International Studies, 6 March 2015, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eqpat0jCpeQ&feature=youtu.be>.

¹⁷ Etzioni, *Security First*, 8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 216.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 238. Note that Etzioni cites similar proposals from Harvard's Graham Allison and others who study nonproliferation. Also see Graham Allison's *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005). For this author's views on the successes and failures in past U.S. and UN counterproliferation efforts, see Joseph R. Cerami, *Leadership and Policy Innovation—From Clinton to Bush: Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Routledge, 2013).



Members of the P5+1 meet with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran in September 2015. Source: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe.

The threat of nuclear weapons of mass destruction continues to dominate headlines, especially with regard the P5+1 and Iran.²⁰ Regarding Iran’s nuclear programs, former U.S. diplomat William F. Burns reminds us that we live in an imperfect world and we have to consider the realities of the world as it is in all of its complexity. In brief, Burns argues that WMD proliferation threats do not have expiration dates and sunset clauses. Like the ongoing conflicts with the Soviet Union during Cold War arms control negotiations and treaties, Burns reminds us that the Middle East remains in “deep

disarray” and there is no reason to expect an “overnight transformation” from Iran’s current posture as a “revolutionary, regionally disruptive force.”²¹

Official U.S. government policy statements maintain the longstanding concerns regarding the nuclear and other regional threats. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense’s *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* points to Iran defying international law and pursuing capabilities to develop nuclear weapons: “Even as Iran pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons, Iran’s other destabilizing activities will continue to pose a threat to the Middle East,” especially to U.S. regional allies and partners.²² Given the past three decades of conflict between the U.S. and Iran, including the more recent imposition of sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union, it will take time and effort to build trust for more cooperation and shared norms regarding WMD proliferation, as well as for supporting political movements that include terrorism rather than the rule of law. In the meantime, it will be prudent to consider Iran as a threat in the forms of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, as well as its potential to assist in using conventional and unconventional military forces in activities that threaten U.S. and European regional allies and partners, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and Israel.

Rather than being transfixed by the recent announcements, the WMD threats remain of concern. The Pakistani, North Korean, and Russian loose nukes threats remain, as do the

²⁰ The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the U.S., China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—plus Germany. Arms Control Association, “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” in Fact Sheets and Briefs, January 2014, at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.

²¹ William J. Burns, “The Fruits of Diplomacy With Iran,” *The New York Times*, 2 April 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/opinion/a-good-deal-with-iran.html?smid=fb-share&_r=2.

²² Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014), 5.

possibilities for reducing the vulnerabilities through reforms in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.²³ In the near term, the potential for Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program, as well as the safety and security of the nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the stockpiles of the other regional nuclear states, remains a threat to continue to watch closely.

Assessing the threats to states should be supplemented with a deep understanding of the threats to the people in the conflict zones and the ideas addressed in the concept of human security. Speaking in Indonesia in February 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stressed the need for "new thinking" from traditional national or military security toward a focus on humanitarian elements in both foreign and defense policy:

What we have seen in Asia in recent years is a very real shift that reflects new thinking in U.S. defense strategy overall. A shift away from the permanent presence of, and direct action by, U.S. forces—and toward the building of the capacity of partners to better defend themselves. A shift away from conventional military deterrence as traditionally understood—think of mechanized divisions poised along the Korean demilitarized zone or the central plains of Germany. A shift toward a mix of the so-called "hard" and "soft" elements of national power—where military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and humanitarian elements are integrated in an effort to ensure long-term security based on our own capabilities but also on the enhanced capabilities of our partners.²⁴

Defining the human security dimensions of national security policy and strategy remains unfinished business. The former Secretary of Defense called for learning lessons from ongoing operations and appreciating the significance of the non-military dimensions of policymaking "beyond security." Gates continued to argue that:

Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory. We must not forget our hard-learned lessons or allow the important soft power capabilities developed because of them to atrophy or even disappear. Beyond security, essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation,

²³ Burns, for example, briefly discusses the "absence of a clear divide between civilian and military programs;" "the gray zone in the treaty between the right to use nuclear energy and the prohibition against manufacturing nuclear weapons;" and the task of "building a sturdy firewall between military and peaceful [nuclear] activities." He places this task in the context of the potential for nuclear energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

²⁴ Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, speech to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia, 25 February 2008, text available at: <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2008/02/20080225130031eaifas0.2525141.html#axzz4EEgxbV73>.

good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications.²⁵

Most importantly, the calls for U.S. national security reform and “whole of government” approaches for tackling current and future complex contingencies also demand attention.²⁶ The U.S. human security agenda includes political, economic, and social development, as well as the use of armed forces for humanitarian operations.

The pivot in the U.S. focus from the hard power military interventions of the George W. Bush administration toward the soft or civilian power focus of Barack Obama’s administration is captured in the *2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (QDDR). The clear intent of the document is to steer U.S. efforts toward soft power and human security. The QDDR was the first ever quadrennial review by the U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International Development. The document’s title, “Leading Through Civilian Power,” is a clear indicator of the redirection of U.S. foreign policy toward human security concerns by Secretaries Gates and Hillary Clinton. The next section of this review addresses the threat of failing to meet the human security needs of the populations subjected to “weak governments and failing states.”²⁷

The “failed states” problem points to the security threat that failed, fragile, or failing states “create safe havens for terrorists, insurgencies, and criminal syndicates.”²⁸ Tensions and disruptions to economies and supply routes can escalate to mass atrocities and undermine U.S. values, including democracy and human rights. Thus, the human security focus includes the U.S. “Embracing Conflict Prevention and Response Within Fragile States as a Core Civilian Mission.”²⁹ The tasks include assisting in promoting development, protecting human rights, and providing for people, as well as supporting the building of government institutions that provide “basic but effective security and justice systems.” Good governance and human security go hand in hand and are the basis for a U.S. role in state-building as well as humanitarian operations in response to “disasters, famines, disease outbreaks, and other natural phenomena.” Thus, the plight of Syria’s approximately four million refugees and their impact on the governments and populations of U.S. partners Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and, Europe, all become part of the puzzle for assessing the threatening nature of not emphasizing human security.³⁰ The larger issues

²⁵ Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), 17.

²⁶ See efforts for linking State-Defense-USAID efforts through the Center for Complex Operations (CCO), at <http://cco.ndu.edu/>. The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) was initially formed in the summer of 2008 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and moved in early 2009 to the National Defense University. The CCO publishes the security studies journal *PRISM*.

²⁷ Department of State and USAID, *Leading Through Civilian Power: the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Executive Summary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2010), 12.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁰ “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response/Total Persons of Concern,” UNHCR, 9 July 2015, available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>.

linking political, economic, and social changes brought about by global communications technology and markets should also be considered.

Harvard Professor Joseph Nye provides a more recent review of the interconnectedness of these new, emerging threats on a regional, as well as a global, level. Nye writes of the diffusion of power in the 21st century fostering “transnational issues like financial stability, climate change, terrorism, and pandemics.”³¹ These transnational threats include non-state actors with no regard for national borders that threaten individuals and institutions. The specific non-military threats to individuals are an expansive list, including: bankers’ electronic funds, hackers threatening cyber security, pandemics, and climate change.³² Recent history in the Middle East and North Africa provides a testament to the validity of Nye’s concerns.

Specifically, Nye addresses the Middle East turmoil. He notes the UN’s Arab Human Development Report shows “a region that lagged in literacy, science, non-energy trade and information” as “ripe for disruption.”³³ His pessimistic projection is that the region’s information revolution, coupled with religious and political disruptions, may last for a generation, and compares to the regional conflicts in Europe during the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth century. In concluding, Nye points out that the U.S. will not be able to use military forces to occupy and control the nationalistic populations sparked by the dramatic events of the Arab Spring. The threats to human security in issues regarding the Internet, climate change, and financial stability require new approaches. In particular, Nye challenges the U.S. to consider efforts to “shape the international environment and create incentives for others through trade, finance, culture, and institutions.” He cites former World Bank president Robert Zoellick’s argument that “there are opportunities today to adapt the world to America’s benefit that do not involve U.S. military force.”³⁴ These opportunities will be strengthened through an agenda of security first, as Etzioni argues, but most profitably considered as human security and state security issues.

Mediterranean Regional Threats Since the 2011 Arab Spring: European Perspectives

Like the U.S. government, the European Union’s official publications provide insights on pre- and post-Arab Spring Middle Eastern threats. Starting with the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) document, which was reviewed in 2008, the European Council, which provided the conceptual framework for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) identified five key threats, including:

1. Terrorism
2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

³¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Is the American Century Over?* (Malden, MA: Polity Press), 95.

³² *Ibid.*, 96.

³³ *Ibid.*, 106.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.

3. Regional conflicts
4. State failure
5. Organized crime³⁵

The European Union's elaborate organizational structures and accompanying webpages reflect the European approach to institution building. Established recently, in 2011, under the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the European External Action Service (EEAS) is the EU's diplomatic service that combines both foreign and security policy under a High Representative, currently Federica Mogherini of Italy. The EU's founding treaty principles reflect a liberal internationalist perspective as well as an emphasis on human security:

Formally launched on 1 January 2011, the Service was created by the Treaty of Lisbon, which itself entered into force in 2009. The principles guiding the EU's activity abroad are defined in the Treaty: The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.³⁶

Founding history, principles, concepts and strategies are essential for understanding the nature of the European Union and its supporting organizational structures, policies, and programs. The EU Council's 2008 review, "Report on the Implementation of the Initial 2003 European Security Strategy,"³⁷ is also significant as a reflection of the continuity and changes in European threat perceptions. For instance, the 2008 implementation report suggests the EU remains an "anchor of stability" for the continent and for global security. Additionally, the report suggests the effectiveness of the neighborhood policy³⁸ and the framework of the southern and eastern partners. The report highlights the important new dimension provided by the Union for the Mediterranean

³⁵ See the European Union External Action fact sheet on the European Security Strategy at: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/>.

³⁶ European Union External Action, "About the European External Action Service (EEAS)," available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/about/index_en.htm.

³⁷ The European Council of the European Union, "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World" (hereafter referred to as "Implementation Report"), available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

³⁸ For information on the European Neighborhood policy, see European Union External Action, "European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)," available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm. For information on the Union for the Mediterranean, formerly known as the Barcelona process, see European Union External Action, "Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)," available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm.

as helping to respond to emerging and complex threats.³⁹ It should be noted that the Union highlights a number of key initiatives that address environmental, economic, transportation, and other issues, but does not emphasize issues related to security threats.⁴⁰ In particular, one explicit 2008 policy statement has not stood up well over time: “Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues—anywhere.”⁴¹ That said, the report makes no reference to concerns about conventional or civil wars in Europe’s Mediterranean neighborhood.

The 2008 report also points to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the number one security threat.⁴² The threats from Iran and North Korea are highlighted. Iran is portrayed as a danger to regional stability as well as to the “whole non-proliferation system.”⁴³ The pressing concerns for Nonproliferation Treaty reform, as well as for establishing the updated rules needed in expectation of an increasing demand for civilian nuclear power, deserve more attention. Specific concerns are those of a technical nature, including the “nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles;” and calling for a multilateral treaty “banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.”⁴⁴

In 2008, terrorism and organized crime were listed as the number two threat facing the European Union. Then, the policy prescription included more organizational responses, including appointing EU counterterrorism coordinators, and constructing crisis coordination and civil protection mechanisms.⁴⁵ The EU also highlights initiatives for great multilateralism, especially with the United Nations (UN). The UN’s Alliance of Civilizations is promoted and continues the work started in 2005 by Secretary General Kofi Annan and sponsored by the Governments of Spain and Turkey.

The UN Alliance of Civilizations is a “High-Level Group of experts” formed by Mr. Annan “to explore the roots of polarization between societies and cultures today, and to recommend a practical programme of action to address this issue.”⁴⁶ The current director, or High Representative, has addressed the linkages among development and global security: “He reiterated on several occasions that peace, security, human rights and development are mutually reinforcing elements; without peace there will be no chance for development. He firmly believes that building tolerance, respecting diversity and promoting co-existence is a moral obligation if we want to advance the causes of peace, human rights and development.”⁴⁷

³⁹ The European Council, “Implementation Report,” 1, 6.

⁴⁰ See European Union External Action, “Union for the Mediterranean (UfM),” available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm, for key initiatives of the UfM.

⁴¹ The European Council, “Implementation Report,” 2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ UNAOC: United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, “Who We Are,” available at: <http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/>.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

The 2015 global forums provided opportunities to discuss initiatives to reduce tensions, but the implementation and effectiveness of the UN Alliance and other multilateral agencies is clearly a work in progress. High Representative H.E. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, in March 2015, struck the right chords in terms of aspirations for promoting a “global, collective security architecture with a clear role for regional arrangements.”⁴⁸ Given the events of the Arab Spring, as well as the ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts, the summary from the 2008 implementation report rang true in 2015, in that “Progress has been slow and incomplete.”⁴⁹

Gaps between the other aspirations in 2008 and 2015 remain interesting for comparison purposes in terms of contrasting goals with policy implementation. For instance, in 2008, with the formation of the Union for the Mediterranean, there was more emphasis on diplomacy and development than on military operations, civil wars, and terrorism. The implementation report suggests the effectiveness of European diplomacy in the Israel-Palestine conflict due to the potential of the Quartet, including the EU, UN, U.S., and Russian Federation.⁵⁰ Additional initiatives in the report include the relationship linking development to state fragility, maritime safety, energy, water, and migration, etc.⁵¹

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) published a study titled “European Agenda on Security,” in January 2015. The CFR assessment positively summarizes the European Union’s “actions, measures and initiatives” to fight terrorism, in particular. The elevation of the terrorist threat and the European Commission’s counterterrorism efforts are addressed as ready for adoption in 2015 to provide a “focus for security priorities during 2015–2020.”⁵² Again, the EU’s legal-structural preferences are related in a CFR overview that stresses the EU’s organizational and process priorities, including: an Internal Security Strategy; the Schengen Information System or Civil Protection Mechanism; the Radicalisation Awareness Network; and the U.S. Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. The CFR overview includes links to the EU security strategies of 2003 and 2010. What the CFR overview and the EU fact sheet of the European Agenda on Security do not clearly reflect is an assessment of successes and failures of the strategies in terms of the events that led to the Arab Spring or the impact of the Union for the Mediterranean and other neighborhood policies in the pre- and post-Arab Spring periods. In essence, there is a question of the need for a comprehensive performance review that assesses whether the previous attempts, policies, strategies, processes, and organizations effectively identify threats and develop more

⁴⁸ H.E. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, The UN High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, “Remarks at Mediation in the Mediterranean Seminar” (text of speech given at Casa Arabe, Madrid, 17 March 2015), available at: <http://www.unaoc.org/2015/03/remarks-by-h-e-nassir-abdulaziz-al-nasser-the-un-high-representative-for-the-alliance-of-civilizations-at-the-mediation-in-the-mediterranean-seminar/>.

⁴⁹ The European Council, “Implementation Report,” 4.

⁵⁰ See European Union External Action, “The EU and the Middle East Peace Process,” available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/index_en.htm.

⁵¹ The European Council, “Implementation Report,” 4.

⁵² Council on Foreign Relations, “European Agenda on Security: Fighting terrorism at EU level, an overview of Commission’s actions, measures and initiatives,” 11 January 2015, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/european-agenda-security/p35993>.

effective security policies. The subject of strategic and net assessments is highlighted in the concluding section that suggests areas for future research.

Two European research centers—the Centre for European Policy Studies and Bertelsmann Stiftung—have also reviewed the EU’s performance and provide very critical assessments. The Centre for European Policy Studies, in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, in February 2015, asserts that emergencies, hybrid threats, defense spending cuts, and evolving global trends “have all eroded the EU’s role as a security action in a multipolar world.”⁵³ They suggest that reforms are urgently needed in strategy, institutional capabilities, and resources, noting that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) requires serious reform. They conclude that, in view of the “grave threats” to European security and defense, a more efficient and effective framework requires taking “bold and concrete steps.”⁵⁴ A similar review by the Bertelsmann Stiftung is equally critical of the European Union’s neighborhood strategy. The title of their study, “The EU Neighbourhood in Shambles,” certainly telegraphs their main finding.⁵⁵ In a sharply pointed critique, they contend that the “arc of instability” from the EU’s eastern borders to the Mediterranean basin “has undermined its flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).” They conclude the ENP “has manifestly failed and needs to be radically rethought.” Their call is for “transformational change,” saying it “should embrace a wider range of actors, including civil society, promote entrepreneurship and help reform countries’ police and military forces.”

The evolution of the European Union’s foreign and defense policy and strategy continues. The path forward is described extensively in a June 2016 document: *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe; A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*.⁵⁶ The overarching themes of liberal internationalism continue in terms of emphasizing collaborative problem solving, favoring soft over hard power, and stressing multilateralism and regional and international organizations. The grand strategy, attributed to the efforts by Frederica Mogherini and her advisor Nathalie Tocci, is meant to serve as an “intellectual framework” or

⁵³ Centre for European Policy Studies, “More Union in European Defense: Report of a CEPS Task Force” (Brussels, 2015).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung, “The EU Neighbourhood in Shambles: Some recommendations for a new European neighbourhood strategy” (Gütersloh, Germany, 2015), 3, available at: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/The_EU_neighbourhood_in_shambles.pdf.

⁵⁶ Frederica Mogherini, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” (Brussels: European Commission, June 2016), 53–57, available at: <http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/>. Note that the acknowledgments includes a long list of contributors, including all EU Member States; the European Commission and Parliament; international research institutes; and partners, including Brazil, Georgia, Japan, Norway, and the U.S. Staff support is attributed to the European External Action Service’s Strategic Planning Division.

vision to guide future direct policies and actions.⁵⁷ The big new idea is for the EU to declare itself as a “global security provider.”⁵⁸ The strategy’s expansive reach clearly “goes beyond NATO.”⁵⁹

Jan Techau of Carnegie Europe addresses the document’s strengths and weaknesses in “The EU’s New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless?”⁶⁰ Aside from the “horrible” timing given the 23 June 2016 British Brexit referendum, Techau notes the “superficial treatment” of the document in the European Council meeting on 28 June. Nevertheless, rather than pointless, the author applauds the two-year study as “thoughtful and rich” and recognizes the “brutal seriousness of Europe’s bleak geopolitical situation.”⁶¹ Techau is also positive about the strengths of the document and its realistic prescription for “principled pragmatism” and the end of the EU’s ambitious goals that included democratization, the European Neighborhood Policy, and EU enlargement.⁶²

Techau sees value in the traditional emphasis on a rules-based international order, as well as pointing out Russian violations of international law in the Ukraine. At the same time, he is concerned about the organizational fragmentation separating the foreign ministers from the European Council. Bureaucratic and organizational capacity issues for developing programs and activities, and decision-making processes, to support the global vision are of concern, as well.⁶³ For U.S. policymakers, also of concern is the documents’s lack of attention to the transatlantic relationship. Techau writes: “The United States will remain key to the EU’s role in the world for many years to come, and the paper’s blind spot on this crucial and uncomfortable part of the transatlantic relationship is not healthy.”⁶⁴ Overall, Techau argues that Mogherini’s global strategy document is to be praised for having said what is necessary for the EU and Europe to “count for something in the world.”⁶⁵

Counting for something in the world will also require translating the document’s vision from an intellectual framework into the ends, ways, and means of strategy. That requires careful consideration of supporting missions, tasks, and performance measures for a multitude of

⁵⁷ Daniela Vincenti, “Mogherini’s global strategy moves beyond zero-sum game,” EurActiv.com, 28 June 2016, available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/mogherinis-global-strategy-moves-beyond-zero-sum-game/>.

⁵⁸ Mogherini, “Shared Vision, Common Action,” 3.

⁵⁹ Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Global Strategy: ‘We must be ready to go beyond NATO,’” *POLITICO*, 28 June 2016, available at: <http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-global-strategy-we-must-be-ready-to-go-beyond-nato-foreign-policy-security-policy/>.

⁶⁰ Jan Techau, “The EU’s New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless?” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 1 July 2016, available at: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=63994>.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid. Techau cites the Egmont Institute’s Sven Biscop on welcoming the end of the EU’s “overbearing language on democracy promotion.”

⁶³ Ibid. In particular, Techau notes the “underfunding and underequipping” of the European External Action Service and Mogherini’s High Representative foreign policy office, and “hopelessly bureaucratizing decision-making procedures in this fractured institutional lineup” within the various EU bodies.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

supporting governmental, nonprofit, and humanitarian organizations, as well private sector engagement. The requirements of good strategy by a variety of strategic management scholars point to the critical early problem-solving step of identifying obstacles or constraints. For instance, UCLA Professor Richard Rumelt argues that: “Good strategy works by focusing energy and resources on one, or a very few, pivotal objectives whose accomplishment will lead to a cascade of favourable outcomes.”⁶⁶ Translating the positive, rational, emotional, and principled-based, historical arguments of the EU vision into actionable policies, plans, and programs are the next phase of Mogherini’s tasking from the EU leadership. Resources, decision-making processes, and bureaucratic constraints, as well as the press of current events in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Syria, Libya, and the rest of the globe, will intrude on the EU’s planning. It will be interesting to follow Mogherini’s staff work in the next phase, as it is reported that: “Member states will consider the strategy’s implementation until the end of the year [2016].”⁶⁷ Given the uncertain future and the reverberating, ongoing shocks and threats emerging from the Arab Spring, there are several important research needs to consider to continue to improve U.S. and EU, as well as Arab coalition partners’, policies and strategies to enhance Mediterranean security.

Areas for Future Research: National Security Reform and Aligning, Integrating, and Synchronizing the Three Ds of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development

Integrating the instruments of power, including SOF, for European and NATO southern and eastern flank regional security in light of the recent revolutions in MENA remains an elusive goal. For insights on the U.S.’s overarching policy objectives, we can return to President Obama’s own words in his Cairo speech in 2009. In his opening, he calls for a “new beginning” that emphasizes “common principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.”⁶⁸ The speech goes on to address many of the issues identified in critical theory in the early sections of this paper. How the U.S. and NATO special forces can assist Arab coalition partners to substantially contribute to the ‘3Ds’ of diplomacy, defense, and development, and assist in building regional and state security in new and creative ways to address the threats and opportunities of the Arab Spring, remains to be seen. The ability of the U.S., EU, NATO, and other states to respond effectively to the threats created by Arab Spring revolutions and

⁶⁶ Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters* (New York: Crown Business, 2011), 53. Other management scholars who emphasize the significance of individual and organizational constraints in designing effective strategies in changing times, while facing disruptive threats, include: Tim Brown, *Change By Design* (New York: Harper Business, 2009); Clayton Christensen, *The Innovator’s Dilemma* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: The Free Press, 1994); and Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, *The Knowing-Doing Gap* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000).

⁶⁷ Vincenti, “Mogherini’s global strategy moves beyond zero-sum game.”

⁶⁸ “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” *The New York Times*, 4 June 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

counterrevolutions remains a work in progress that should consider creative ways to link theory and practice, and convert ideas into action.

Most importantly, the calls for U.S. national security reform and ‘whole of government’ approaches for tracking current and future complex contingencies demand more attention in light of the failures of externally sanctioned regime changes in Iraq and Libya, by the United States in one case and NATO in the other. In addition, the complementary topics in the area of human security as well as Arab governmental reform should include transformational diplomacy, state building, women in security and development, refugees, genocide, and the UN’s concept of the responsibility to protect. Political violence and warfare in MENA, from Iraq to Libya to Egypt to Syria, should cause U.S., European, and other international diplomats and soldiers to pause and examine alternative approaches.

The call for adapting hard power diplomacy and defense capabilities was answered to a certain extent in the early Obama presidential administration. There can be no doubt, however, that the problems of economic and political development, institution and state building, rule of law and reconciliation, and governance and civil society will remain on the international security agenda for some time to come. In short, the challenge is in turning shatterbelts (insecure geographic spaces between regions) into gateways (secure pathways between regions)⁶⁹ and supporting new regimes that can engage in meaningful ways in regional geopolitics and international economics. European and U.S. proponents of human security will have to address the knotty issues of domestic politics and assisting regimes that promote the internal political and economic development of civil societies that mitigate the threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals.⁷⁰

The ideas behind these suggested transformational approaches and national security reform efforts to revitalize the 3Ds has been addressed in numerous Washington, D.C., workshops and conferences.⁷¹ As stated earlier, the 3Ds concept and enhancing ‘civilian power’ was initially highlighted by former Secretary of Defense Gates, as well as former Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Clinton.⁷² Emphasizing what Nye calls “smart power,”⁷³ the 3Ds concept was promoted in response to problems in effective collaboration in the wars in Iraq and

⁶⁹ The terms “shatterbelts and gateways” can be found in Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*, Second Edition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 44, 50.

⁷⁰ Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001): 87–102.

⁷¹ On national security reform efforts, see James R. Locher III, et al., *Project On National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield*, (Arlington, VA: Project on National Security Reform, 2011), available at: http://www.pnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/pnsr_forging_a_new_shield_report.pdf. Also see Joseph R. Cerami, Robert H. Dorff, and Matthew H. Harber, eds., *National Security Reform 2010: A Mid-Term Assessment* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Book, 2011).

⁷² Department of State and USAID, *QDDR: Leading Through Civilian Power*. Also see Department of State and USAID, *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007–2012: Transformational Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, USAID, May 2007), available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf>.

⁷³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Powers to Lead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Afghanistan among the Departments of Defense and State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In brief, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have hindered the ability of development personnel to focus exclusively on their core mission; that is, to help needy populations abroad in long-term efforts that build effective programs in agriculture, business, and education. In Iraq, Syria, and Libya, USAID workers (including U.S. and foreign nationals) have been targeted because of their association with not only the military itself, but also the overall mission, i.e., regime change, democratization, and counterinsurgency warfare.

Retired diplomat Steven Sestanovich, now with the Council on Foreign Relations, has pointed out that the pattern following unpopular, indecisive wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is for the United States to cut defense spending and troop numbers and focus more on diplomacy.⁷⁴ Sestanovich also points to a second trend in the increasing role of Congress: the emphasis on congressionally initiated national security and intelligence reform movements following the post–World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Cold War periods.

An important concluding thought is that the U.S. has never been able to predict the “next war.”⁷⁵ So, it will be prudent, if not humbling, for the State and Defense Departments, USAID, and humanitarian relief organizations, as well as all levels of U.S. and NATO commands and other agencies in the expansive security sector, to ensure the recent and ongoing lessons are not lost. This, of course, is difficult work, but difficult is not impossible. The success of American foreign and defense policies, strategies, and doctrines for ongoing and future wars will require improving the U.S.’s overall effectiveness for implementing the 3Ds in diplomatic negotiations, conventional wars, counterterrorism, stability and reconstruction efforts, foreign aid programs, and humanitarian relief operations.

Far-reaching and long-term reforms will require the active engagement of the next generation of special operations officers. There is a pressing need for the education, training, and development of soldier-statemens, as warrior-diplomats, to effectively meet the emerging challenges in MENA and other global troublespots. In charting new directions for development of junior officers as emerging leaders, there is much research from multiple sources that suggests pathways. As John Kotter of the Harvard Business School writes, given the rapid pace of change, there is no guarantee that what was suggested based on past research regarding emerging leader development will last over time.⁷⁶ While a philosophical and historical grounding is certainly of importance, the topics of values, character, and virtue deserve constant attention. For integrating emerging leader development in the special operations community then, there are three areas that deserve continuing and even increasing attention: considering the role of apprenticeships as part

⁷⁴ Stephen Sestanovich, “The Price of Pulling Back From the World,” *The New York Times*, 9 February 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/opinion/the-price-of-pulling-back-from-the-world.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1.

⁷⁵ Robert M. Gates, in *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary At War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 590, writes: “In the forty years since Vietnam, our record in predicting where we will be militarily engaged next, even six months out, is perfect: we have never once gotten it right....”

⁷⁶ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012).

of professional development, bridging transitions for individuals at all levels, and especially, linking leadership assessment instruments and performance measures and coaching.

It is safe to say that emerging leaders prefer individual attention. One-size-fits-all assessment tools that are not linked to personal development planning and coaching are not taken seriously. This, of course, adds to the tasks of learning organizations and mentoring supervisors. In general, it may be better to make no claims about an organization's emphasis on developing junior leaders if resources, including people, time, and programs, are not devoted to guiding the use of assessment tools linked to educational programs that provide the knowledge and skills for understanding complex security challenges. For military, government, and nonprofit organizations, too, there is a need to explain how the individual leader's development process creates value in terms of improving performance at the individual, team, organizational, and even institutional, levels. Those performance indicators become both more important as well as more difficult when engaging in cross-sector, cross-national, and cross-cultural work environments that are common for special operations officers. In U.S. national security reform initiatives, struggling with gaining support for 'whole of government' efforts, the benefits of individual contributions and overall agency/organizational performance within the international and regional operating environments should be addressed more fully in the future.⁷⁷

For instance, the number and quality of reports and case studies of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) are extensive. Linking past experiences with current contexts and designing individual and organizational assessment tools and performance measures, such as connecting lessons learned centers with training and education programs, plus the potential for guiding efforts for informing current operations, remains a critical research need. Several of the PNSR's Significant Implementation Initiatives that relate directly to emerging leader development require further research and study. In addition to the recommended broader agency structural reforms, their initiative on human capital—to "Align personnel incentives, leader development, personnel preparation, and organizational culture with strategic objectives"—deserves more focused attention.⁷⁸ Their proposals for creating a national security professionals' program is important in its potential to improve emerging leader development programs across the U.S. and foreign governments and militaries. In addition, those private and nonprofit organizations immersed internationally in public-private partnerships, contracting, and collaborative operational

⁷⁷ See the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), on the webpage of the Center for Complex Operations (CCO), accessed 20 September 2014 at: [the National Defense University, cco.dodlive.mil/pnsr-case-studies/](http://www.dodlive.mil/pnsr-case-studies/). The Bush School also participated in several workshops and conferences with PNSR participants and other subject matter experts. Books, monographs, and reports published by the Strategic Studies Institute include: *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare, Leadership and National Security Reform, Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Government" National Security Reform*, and *National Security Reform 2010: A Mid-Term Assessment*, accessed 20 September 2014 at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=518>, accessed 9/20/2014.

⁷⁸ Project on National Security Reform, *Turning Ideas into Action* (September 2009), vi, at www.pnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf, accessed 9/20/2014.

efforts, would benefit from cross-training that includes certification processes and experiential learning to ensure some level of common knowledge as well as skill requirements.

The PNSR proposal blends well with emerging ideas about resurrecting formal “apprenticeships.” Given the explosion in online university and certificate programs, as well as the costs of moving, housing, and losing time in the workforce, other opportunities outside of traditional schooling should be explored. Supplementing work experience with the learning opportunities available from new sources, such as massive open online courses (MOOCs), should make integrated work-learning experiences relevant for individual development while improving performance in the workplace, in real time, for individuals, teams, and organizations. To be effective, research suggests that any and all of these developmental learning opportunities require real-time coaching and are only effective over time when woven into the activities of the daily work environment.

Sarah Ayres Steinberg, a policy analyst for the Center for American Progress, captures the potential for structured apprenticeships in “5 Reasons Expanding Apprenticeships Will Benefit Millennials.” Going beyond the common internship experience for emerging leader education programs (including in military precommissioning education) will provide benefits. Steinberg explains these five benefits in several studies. She points out that: (1) apprenticeships are jobs; (2) apprentices earn higher wages; (3) apprentices gain an education with little or no debt; (4) apprenticeships create a pathway to middle-class jobs for those without a four-year degree; and (5) apprenticeships grow the economy by making American businesses more competitive.⁷⁹

Translating Steinberg’s ideas from the private sector into the military, government, and nonprofit sectors opens an avenue for creative thinking and suggests potential initiatives for improving human capital and professionalism in all sectors. Incorporating apprenticeship programs on a meaningful scale has the potential to link individual needs and performance, prescribe certifications and the equivalent of professional licensing (similar to that for doctors and engineers), identify skills-based standards, and create opportunities for action learning. Imagination is necessary for implementing these initiatives and more research on the feasibility, affordability, and effectiveness of these approaches is also needed.

A final area for consideration is the need to assist individuals with transitions. For instance, universities and military schools provide internal career services and leader development programs, but these efforts are mainly contained within the school experience. Making the difficult early transition from school to the work environment is equivalent to high-wire acrobats “flying without a net.” Because of those early stresses, complicated by the expectations of both entry level workers and supervisors, there is a much greater need for early transition coaching than is necessary for leaders at the mid- and senior levels, when most thoughtful individuals will have developed experience-based knowledge as well as strong networks to ease new career paths. That

⁷⁹ Sarah Ayres Steinberg, “5 Reasons Expanding Apprenticeships Will Benefit Millennials,” Center for American Progress, accessed 11 July 2014 at: <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2013/12/02/79872/5-reasons-expanding-apprenticeships-will-benefit-millennials/>.

said, there are few resources available for the emerging leaders to bridge the school-to-workplace gap, as well as the gaps when shifting from a national to multinational organization. Research will assist in thinking about better ways for individuals and organizations to bridge those development gaps. Creative, research-based ideas are essential, especially for those education, training, and development programs that aspire to assist emerging leaders in transitioning relatively seamlessly from their educational experiences into the operational environment with a commitment to lifelong learning.⁸⁰

Future research should also study the role of SOF in light of the large issues regarding America's leadership in the world; U.S. and EU grand and regional strategies; U.S. bilateral relations in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa; and international-, regional-, and country-level strategic and net assessments. The U.S. role in the world is subject to continuing debate among scholars, policymakers, and politicians. Currently, there is a growing literature designed to influence the next presidential administration.⁸¹ No doubt the next U.S. presidential administration will seek both continuity and change in defining the U.S. national interest, identifying threats and opportunities, and setting global and regional priorities. Leadership from the next president will be necessary to address the perceived decline in the U.S. and EU resources available for international affairs, and an accompanying decline in the perceived utility of military forces both in the U.S. and Europe.

Similarly, within the SOF and defense communities, the relative risks of the potential for conflict in Europe, Asia, and MENA should be assessed with an eye toward addressing the SOF roles and missions in conventional and unconventional wars. In addition, the SOF roles are critical to preparing U.S. and NATO, as well as Arab host nations', militaries to counter the real threats of weapons of mass destruction proliferation, refugees, pandemics, and terrorism. In the Middle East and North Africa, there is currently no expectation that the problems of state legitimacy, good governance, civil society, and civil-military relations can be addressed effectively in the short run. At each level of analysis—internationally, regionally, and bilaterally—there is a need for periodic strategic and net assessments on the roles and missions of SOF.

The role of strategic and net assessments has evolved since its inception during the Cold War and now must evaluate threats from state and non-state actors.⁸² The first studies that influenced the founding of strategic and net assessments were by the nuclear weapons thinkers in the context of Cold War perspectives. Contemporary net assessments should analyze threats and

⁸⁰ For an in-depth discussion of emerging leader development, see Joseph R. Cerami, *Pathways for Emerging Leaders: Bridging Civil-Military Education and Training Gaps* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).

⁸¹ For a variety of perspectives, see Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁸² For a study of the evolution of net assessments from early RAND research to the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, see Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, *The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy* (New York: Basic Books, 2015). A detailed annotated bibliography by Joseph R. Cerami on "Strategic and Net Assessments" can be found in *Oxford Bibliographies Online*, at <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/>.

scenarios in the context of current events, as the concept of security has broadened throughout the post–Cold War era. The early net assessment research focused on what the discipline would now consider traditional foreign and defense policy issues. The topics included superpower relationships, the nuclear balance of power, and high-level defense policy and military strategic issues. The role of science and technology, advanced military systems, nuclear deterrence, and military innovation were all topics of interest.

The post–Cold War period brought renewed attention to sub-state conflict involving longstanding religious and ethnic violence. In addition, the emergence of peace studies and transnational issues received increasing attention. Peace studies and transnational threats took center stage during the 1990s, furthered by the expansion of the UN and member states increasing attention to peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian interventions. In addition, a renewed emphasis on international development and governance issues, especially regarding failed, failing, and fragile states, added to the range of security studies.

The post–Arab Spring era in the MENA requires a similar evolution in national security policy, strategy, and net assessments, especially in highlighting the significance of regional geopolitics. There is a need for reform in the three areas suggested here: U.S. national security policy-making; in preparing the next generation of emerging leaders for the challenges of engaging SOF in international and interagency operations in complex regions like MENA; and in designing collaborative efforts among defense and military professionals, diplomats, and development experts at the international, regional, national, and local levels.



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