The views expressed in this video are entirely those of the speaker[s] and do no necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United States Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

JSOU - The fourth age of SOF: the use and utility of Special Operations Forces in a new age history, theory and future practices scene setter with Dr. Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, JSOU President and CSM Shane Shorter, SEA, JSOU. Day 1, 29 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Show Notes:

-          When we speak about “Ages of SOF”, we are referring to organizational structure essentially, and how ours has or has not changed over time to help us – SOF  -- meet mission requirements for Nation.

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We like a “Back to our Futures” approach to framing or rediscovering, the Ages, and this involves 3 main questions: a) how is Global Geopolitical or Power Competition changing, and what are the implications of such change (good and bad)?  b)  What does this mean for Special Ops and SOF, for next 30 years?  c)  What will change / needs to change for SOF to meet mission requirements? Consider: 12 core tasks, joint combined competencies, SOF’s value proposition – what can we offer, force structure,  force modernization, force design, etc.

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    Consider all this in the context of: 2022 draft National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy

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    3^rd Age of SOF -- James Dietz’ “Call to Colors” Print, explanation. The GWOT Era in hindsight – this is the 3^rd Age of SOF, which shows: failure of preventative deterrence, reactionary posture, under-preparedness, Iraq and Afghanistan Wars define the 3^rd Age. But new light ahead – hope through new intention, benefits of anticipation, benefits of foresight. SOF Operators at the left of the print show SOF at the vanguard of change.

o   Afghanistan withdrawal in August 2021, puts an end to the 3^rd Age of SOF, closes out the second GWOT War.

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SOF are at another threshold crossing, Compound Security, driven by a Compound Security Dilemma. Need SOF that is equally “compounded” – use all we have learned from the last 3 Ages and make new. We lose nothing, we take it all and use it.

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Compound Security – this dynamic is placing new demands on us – New Operational Overview. Conflicts at the Seem – low intensity conflict, indirect force, physical and human terrain at the sub - system level. Gain positional advantage – in physical, virtual, and ideationally*

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Sources of conflict can be viewed as sources of opportunity

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Old School Mercantilism – going back to a more transactional international relations – breakdown of Westphalia

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Early Age – task forces used for Special Ops – team put together and then disbanded after mission complete.

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  1^st Age – WW2 – still disbanding after wars. But were becoming able to see the values of SOF.

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    2^nd Age --  President John F Kennedy saw the need to build COIN and that SOF was the way. In response to Cold War threats against nationalism.

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   3^rd Age – started w/ Operation Eagle Claw and the establishment of USSOCOM. Goes through Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, 9/11, and ends with the end of GWOT, August 2021.

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  Now begins the 4^th Age of SOF – exploitation of traditional Western institutions. China and Russia no longer playing by established norms.

o   China – island building, Taiwan, One Belt One Road Initiative

o   Russia  --  little green men and Wagner Group, bold invasion. Georgia, Ukraine

o   We must view these threats NOT ONLY as singularly and separate threats, BUT ALSO in light of ALL the other threats – Iran, Terrorism, CWMD, Climate, Information, etc

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    How do we overcome transactional relationships? How can we find positional advantage?  Mention of Commanding Heights in the One Belt One Road Initiative.

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   Is the key to preventing hot wars using irregular warfare in order to extend the length of periods of relative peace?

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   SOF Value Proposition:  SOF has the most professional, educated, discipline, and mature forces our nation has to offer. SOF can help in 5 ways:  Geostrategic Shapers, Agent of Influence, Integrated Deterrence, Help pursue ideological supremist and CWMD proliferators, SOF Options for traditional warfare and crisis response

JSOU SOF Q2 Forum - Panel 1 - Day 1, 29 March 2022 Panel 1: Ages of SOF from a Historical Perspective What are the major historical lessons from each previous age of Special Operations, and how can they be used to prepare for the future? Moderator: Mr. John Melkon Panel: COL (Ret) Mike Eiland CW4 (Ret.) Mike Rutledge 1LT(P) Shawna Moore Day 1, 29 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Show Notes:

Kings College War Studies research – Royal Navy officers dismissed historical lessons learned from 18^th and 19^th century commanders, which led to rigid Commands. Also, they dismissed technology from past decades and centuries that they should have been familiar with in order to benefit tactically, operationally, and strategically.

We do not study military history, or even history really, in our national education system. Why?  We didn’t want to study the Vietnam War, due to national embarrassment, and so we refused to learn lessons from it. Why did it happen?  Why did it expand?  What did we do wrong?

Next was the Cold War, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), as well as the desire to abandon warfare altogether. Elites searched for the source of the problem, the “warmongers” they considered to be the “establishments” of the government, military, religion, etc. They saw war as a failure of human action / inaction.  Trotsky – “You may not be interested in war, but it is interested in you”.

Panelist 1:  COL (Ret) Mike Eiland – 1^st Age of SOF.  1964-1974 – SOF HQ never existed, no SOF doctrine or anything like that existed. All was tactical. SE Asia, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia.

        Question: What inspired you to come into Special Operations?   Answer:  His first year as a lieutenant, he met a SOF operator, and noticed his professionalism and was inspired by his stories.  SOF was a career killer and had a bad reputation of attracting rogues and misfits. But he did well in it anyway and also went to Vietnam. 

               Question:  Discuss some lessons learned that have been applied.  Answer:  1)  recruiting has gotten better in order to weed out bad personalities, 2)  communications capability has improved exponentially (but this can be a disadvantage as well), 3)  principal of war that we violate the most is – simplicity. We have many layers of command, and large staffs, which diminishes our agility,  4)  language capability is better now than it was, and could get even better still,  5)  old SOF had too many ethical pitfalls – we do better today, but we have much room for improvement.

Panelist 2:  CW4 (Ret) Mike Rutledge  -- 2^nd Age of SOF.  Enlisted Navy and Warrant Officer Army – 1990 – helicopter pilot, then SEAL Team 1.

                Lessons Learned:  Desert Storm was the first true JOINT environment, but SOF didn’t seem too JOINT at the time, in some ways. The new generation is every bit as tenacious and physically and mentally able to do the job as well or better than we did. As a community, we have overestimated our ability to handle everything mentally. We need to look out for each other, there is no way to do this job for 20-30 years without feeling any effects mentally and physically.

Panelist 3:  1LT Shawna Moore:  4^th Age of SOF, graduated from West Point.  Artillery Officer, Fort Campbell, JSOC, Cultural Support Officer. 4 years so far.

                Lessons:  What do we do well?  1)   Selection and reselection. This is unique and getting better all the time – longer selection, more mentally strong, AND intellectual tasks – SOF is getting smarter. This selection applies also to supporters, which makes the whole force better. Reselection is important because it means you have to repeatedly prove yourself, you are not “tenured”. Keeps SOF professional. 2) Another distinguishing factor is INNOVATION. We encourage innovation, which is not what general forces do. Doctrinally, GPF and SOF are not much different from each other, but they do work different, and this is because SOF is allowed and expected to be innovative, eg:  warm blood transfusions. 3)  Unwavering mastery of doctrine – we are good at quick institutional learning. What we asked of 2^nd age of SOF and 3^rd age of SOF were very different, and it adapted. We are able to innovate and learn and scale to capacity. 4)  Ops-tempo we need to achieve, we have to improve. Figuring out where we fit in the future fight will help us achieve this and get the tempo correct, so that we can sustain forces.

Question:  What’s the greatest challenge from your Age of SOF, and from what you hear and know about the state of the force today, is it still an issue?

Eiland – North Vietnamese Army, is no longer a challenge. Lack of communications was another challenge, and we have gotten better at that. Also, problem of Jointness, which was lacking more then and we have improved upon.

Rutledge – the biggest challenge in sustained combat ops, is finding motivation to a mission that is ongoing. After a year or two, we lose sight of mission and focus more on safety of ourselves and become adverse to risk.

Moore  --  focus on what the next fight looks like. There is a lot of things going on, and not knowing what is going to be most important, we train on various things, but will we be ready for the big fight? What will the next big fight be? 

Melkon --  What are you most excited about for the future, regarding technology?  For Moore.

Moore --  We possess a lot of technology and a lot of combat experience within our force. We have been at a technological overmatch for many years with the forces we have been fighting (ISIS), but going forward, it will be interesting to see how we combine our combat experience with our technological experience to address a new (more technologically competent) enemy and new threats.

Eiland (same question)  --  values are timeless, selfless service among them. As far as technology goes, what concerns me is how we use the technology. We do not have to exercise a capability just because it is there, and we must stay true to our values when we employ technology in the future. We have to balance all this with a tendency to micromanage, and how we recruit and give our best soldiers the ability to solve problems.

Moore – Question: Discuss human factors and psychological factors in the fourth age – we need to establish left and right limits very clearly. Young soldiers are asked to walk the line of what is human dignity and achieving tasks and mission. It is imperative for their psychological health that we set left and right limits and that we keep lines of communication open in order to support them. We ask a lot of them.

Melkon reminds us that allies and partners are crucial to the next fight. And relationships with our allies and partners are not only the responsibility of our government, but of each individual as well.

Panel 2: The Fourth Age of SOF How do the past three “ages of SOF” impact the preparation for, and success in, the Fourth Age of Special Operations? Moderator: COL Mike Harris Panel: Dr. Isaiah “Ike” Wilson Mr. Chris FussellBG (UK) Rob Stephenson MAJ Alex Deep Day 1, 29 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

SHOW NOTES:

Research Question:  How did the past 3 Ages of SOF impact the preparation for, and success in, the 4^th Age of SOF?

Moderator Opener – COL Harris – Panel is a combination of those from 3^rd Age of SOF, moving into the 4^th Age. We seek to be introspective and try to understand what we have learned over the last 20 years that we can apply to the new fight as our nation moves forward in Great Power Competition. Intentionally included MAJ Deep as a field grade officer that will have to transition our lessons learned into something useful going forward for the Enterprise.

Panelists:

Dr. Ike Wilson:  JSOU President, combat vet, Army aviator, strategist, CENTCOM CDR’s Initiative Group, Full Professor of Political Science, taught at West Point, Columbia, Yale, George Washington University, Previously Director of US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

BG Rob Stephenson (UK):  Deputy CDR NATO Special Operations HQ:  35 Years, N. Ireland, Bosnia, N. Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Africa, Masters in Defense Studies, Kings College London.

Mr. Chris Fussell:  Retired Navy SEAL, scholar and author, Senior Fellow for Natl Security New America, Lifetime Member of Council on Foreign Relations

MAJ Alex Deep:  current Army Special Forces, currently at USSOCOM, commanded at numerous levels, combat operations in Afghan and Syria, Masters of Arts in Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Instructor of International Relations, founder of Irregular Warfare Group, Westpoint.

COL Harris – Director of Special Activities at USSOCOM – Moderator.

Dr. Wilson:  Will use a 3 part approach to frame the research question. Focus on Operations, Actions, Activities, ad Investments (OAAI).

Q: Why should we revisit past ages of SOF?  Why do we need to change?

A:  Point 1 --While we may be doing things right, are we doing the right things? We are living in a time of change, and there may be large systems changes as well. We must be ready to change in response to big political changes that are happening. We have to consider what is the same and what is new, and for this we need THEORY.

            We have a New Security Environment, which demands we consider what will change in Special Operations (the nature of the operations), as well as our Forces (operators and professionals). New Use, Utility and Identity required to define what is a special operations and what is a SOF Professional.

            COMPOUND SECURITY DILEMMA:  Primary unique feature that underpins our need for change -- change in global security environment, change in character of global geopolitical competition. What makes this dangerous is the nature of the threat, which is a compounded collection of security threats that we have not been able to understand and solve, and underlying conditions that are complex and multidimensional, trans-everything and temporally dynamic.

           These threats are impossible to contain transnational, transregional, with potential for metastasizing into big multinational wars. Ukraine, Syria, Iraq . . . .

            International Relations:  Beg-thy-neighbor, transactional relationships, less collective security and more DIY security. We HAVE to fight against this with COLLLECTIVE security. Partners and allies are the key to combatting these problems.

           For SOF:  the task at hand requires everything we got – we have to compound all the TTPs and lessons learned form all the past ages of SOF in order to meet the compound threat we face today. Requires a back to our futures perspective.

     Point 2 -- History is illustrative:  SOF hasn’t changed in its importance, it is still as important as it ever has been. Only the environment has changed. But we may need to adapt as we consider the new threat environment. Russia and China openly challenge the traditional rules-based order of international relations.  

      Special Operators must become trans-domain problem-solvers. Also, with access and placement, as well as understanding of human terrain, SOF can provide early warnings long before conflict heats up (rheostat). SOF has presence and relationships, which translates into INFLUENCE.

      SOF must bend escalation curve downward and extend the spaces in between conflict over time (increase spaces of relative peace).

      Point 3 – Combined Joint SOF must be prepared to coordinate all facets on national power.

     Joint combined SOF will play leading role in defining the future role of alliances, we must revamp our messaging strategies in order to gain informational advantage – control the narrative. SOF in technology – SOF must figure out how to leverage new technology without compromising ethics. Where does SOF fit into deterrence? How does SOF power need to be reconsidered, SOF utility and relevancy, what is our role in grey zone conflicts?

BG Rob Stephenson  --  British Army 35 yrs. Began at end of Cold War. From NATO position, when considering the future of great power competition and conflict, I will offer a few thoughts from the European / NATO perspective. Can provide a view of what Dr. Wilson mentioned as the importance of Ally and Partner importance in fighting the compound global threats.

                Agree that the strategic environment and great power competition and conflict is central issue, and note that ‘we’ tend to make the mistake, when we think about the GPC, of comparing it to the Cold War, but it is really not the same strategic context. There are differences.

                The whole of Europe recognizes that it is different from the Cold War, as we see now with Ukraine (Georgia, etc)

                Advances in technology.

     1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd ages of SOF each had their own opportunities to develop innovation and shape the force.  Policy restraints were less, due to the nature of conflicts in the 3^rd age, where now when we are looking at GPC, things will probably move slower, considering the nature of “competition”.

     For the Alliance / NATO, the 3^rd age of SOF has been a catalyst for development. 20 years of war have necessarily brought development. Will we lose some capabilities we had for the 3^rd age? ISR, access, etc.? 3^rd age of SOF has built a capability that is orientated toward the problem set of the last 20 years, and we want to be able to move away from some of the expectations we have created over the past 20 years as we pivot towards a new threat.  (eg: can we continue to provide readiness such as one hour medivacs)?

     *As we look toward the future, we have to think about a SOF capability across the Alliance that is fit for purpose. The U.S. leadership in this Alliance is of key importance. You must understand the strategic environment in order to get the information battle correct.

      Also, communicating with members of the Alliance requires a nuanced approach. Understanding the strategic environment and context is key to develop influence. What you say to Portugal is very different from what you say to Norway, and how you get each one to contribute to a SOF capability fit for purpose. Each country has a different requirement, provides opportunity for influence and building capability.

     Consider supporting law enforcement, and other agencies in some of these countries, where appropriate.

     We don’t want to lose what we have built over the past 20 years, keep developing the relationships, and then ADAPT the capabilities as needed.

     *Key: Understand the Strategic Context, Accept the Changes, Learn the right lessons from the previous ages of SOF, particularly the last 20 years (3^rd age /CT age), and do what we can to unlearn the wrong lessons – particularly, training and recruiting, which we tend to focus backward when writing requirements and we need to focus forward to predict requirements.

Mr. Chris Fussell: Been out of SOF for 10 years but stay engaged (SEAL). Pessimistic on the transformation. The idea of transitions of phases (ages) of SOF could be argued, but as SOF has evolved, we look for trigger points. The forcing function of modern SOF was 9/11. Prior to that was President Kennedy, and a recognition of a need for a SOF force, and so it was built and codified. What is the trigger point for a new age of SOF?

                Maybe it has occurred? Maybe it is Ukraine? But we should discuss if we have had such a trigger point . . . . . there hasn’t been an event that has required us to change.  Dr. Wilson is looking at the world and recognizing a change in context, and stating a need for change, and it would be great if all systems could be predictive and proactive this way, but it is an uphill grind.

                Old Organization:  A hierarchy, specialized units led by generational leader, accomplish a mission, gather intel, analyze, and new decision cycle. McChrystal recognized a need for something else, b/c the enemy was a NETWORK, so we had to adapt. We became a hybrid of structured and unstructured organization. This has been the last 20 years the way we have been organized.

                Now we need a new structure – considering culture of our organization (direct action, kinetic activities is what our culture expects, but we need something else, like space, cyber, information influence), capabilities we need now, and composition of the force (insufficient to solve the next 20 years, SOF has ability and flexibility to bring in other people from society, and employ new selection models, think diversity and inclusion, tech, crypto, cyber experts).

MAJ Alex Deep:  I think that security is a zero sum game, in that the steps one entity takes to secure itself, inherently take away from the security of another.  The zero sum game has come to revolve around INFLUENCE, along the same lines as security, influence capacity is limited.

                We need to take an asymmetric approach toward influence. FID, SA, COIN, CT, UW, etc, are all our tools to engage in irregular warfare (IW), or to influence. As me move to the 4^th age, IW is going to be the standard way to fight. We need to avoid random acts of IW, and make sure that the missions we take are strategically connected in support of a larger goal. IW is a great set of tools, and we are good at it. We just need to avoid random acts of IW and move toward coordinated efforts of IW in a large, strategic campaign.

COL Harris:  Q:  Consider what Dr. Wilson asked – are we doing the right things? And what BG Stephenson said, what do we need to Unlearn? What is one thing we should unlearn from the 3^rd age of SOF?

Wilson:  We have to reconsider our USE and UTILITY from the last 20 years and toward the GPC. What we are going to be essentially doing, is going to be different . . . . . we focused more on some of the 12 core tasks than others. We need to understand we are NOT pivoting from CT, we always have done CT ad we still are going to do it. AND, we are ALSO doing more things for GPC. Strategic rebalance? New wine in old wine skins? No. We need to keep working to understand and explain and educate people about what we do, and what we can do.  Unlearn the simplistic way we talk about what we do.

Fussell:  SOF will have to return to being the SUPPORTING element, where we have become the SUPPPORTED element. It will not stay that way. We will have to return to specialized elements. The world has become hard to understand, and SOF has much to offer because of the nature of what we do.

Deep:  How we conceptualize risk will define how we operate in the 4^th age of SOF.

Harris:  3 things we should unlearn:  unlearn putting ourselves and our need of mission in a box, unlearn that SOF is the supported element, unlearn how we conceptualize risk and risk mitigation.

Wilson:  I think all 3 go back to what Chris put on his whiteboard, speaking to CORE IDENTITY. A synthesis of all 3 comments is that there is a forewarning, that we must understand our identity. We are taught to understand mission by task and purpose – PURPOSE is the defining factor, and we must figure it out. We have to understand what the nation needs from us, our PURPOSE, then consider tasks. We have been doing it backwards.

Fussell:  We evolved the way we did for a specific 20-year effort. In order to change to meet the new fight, we DO HAVE to let some of that go, some of the capability will be lost. How capable do we want and need to be in that part of the mission set – direct action, CT, etc. Should we move some resources over to another area of focus . . . . . . probably.

COL Harris:  Q: What is one thing we need to bring with us from the 3^rd to the 4^th Are of SOF?

Wilson:  F3EAD mindset. The org chart may need to be adjusted, but the core value of INTEGRATION of SOF, needs to be brought forward. We are good at integrating, bringing together all the elements of national power, the force multiplying role. Anauytical approach.

Fussell:  Human networking, and all that Wilson said. Technology and innovation, acquisitions, miniaturization, AI and ML, advancement. We have to keep bringing the cutting edge, challenging norms to get better. Innovative approach.

Deep: Culture of using the partnered approach. Partnered approach.

JSOU SOF Q2 Forum - Keynote Speaker (recorded) GEN Richard Clarke, CDR USSOCOM . Day 1, 29 March 2022. Source: https://www.aspeninstitute.org Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Panel 3: Creating Complexity for Current and Potential Rivals How can Special Operations Forces best create complexity for current and potential rivals during both competition and conflict? Moderator: COL (Ret.) Liam Collins Panel: Mr. Andy Maher, LTC Meghan Cumpston, Dr. David Kilcullin and Mr. Peter Cloutier. Day 1, 29 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Show Notes:

Research Question:  How can Special Operations Forces best create complexity for current and potential rivals during both competition and conflict?

COL (Ret) Liam Collins:  former SOF, PhD Princeton, Director of Combatting Terrorism Center and founding Director Modern War Institute at West Point.

Mr. Andy Maher: 20 yrs Australian Army, doctoral candidate examining proxy warfare

LTC Meghan Cumpston:  G2 1^st Armor Division, MA International Relation John’s Hopkins

Dr. David Kilcullin: Center of Future War, senior fellow, New America, senior diplomat, State Department, senior advisor, author of Accidental Guerrilla, Out of the Mountains

Mr. Peter Cloutier: JSOU Professor, career Foreign Service Officer, USAID

Mr. Andy Maher:  What do we mean by a Special Operation?  It is unorthodox, and it is elite. Public likes to focus on the elite part, but is this always a good thing?  Does focus on the elite cause moral drift? How do we look at what is unorthodox and innovative, in an open source environment?

     Can we create a playbook to identify what our range of options are in order to create complexity for the adversary? Lay out tasks, or “plays” from tactical level to strategic, from less elite to more elite capabilities. Look to the past, not just American operations, but all the special operations in all the past wars, and how might they be adapted with the new capabilities we have today. What was the effect of the operation, and how can we achieve the same effect today, albeit by including new technical capabilities for instance?  Codify all the options in playbook form. Think through these options, deliberately consider specific options, based on effects. This playbook will assist in creating complexity for the enemy by using our collective histories to present options we can visualize and mix and match in a useful way.

COL Collins:  What should we be doing in the Ukraine conflict?

Maher: Competition with Russia creates second order effects when considering Ukraine. The way the Wagner group doubled down in Mali a few weeks ago, was a response to U.S. competition and activities in Ukraine. The way other nations are seizing Russian assets, economic warfare, presents a challenge in that it is difficult for us to assess all these activities and then visualize the overall result. We must look at the globalized scale when we consider results, because it isn’t a bilateral problem. We are doing things, and so are others, and there are effects being achieved.

Collins:  How much does SOF need to engage the Interagency, are we doing enough or do we need to do more to get into the Interagency response?

Maher:  Hyper-Interagency is a requirement of SOF if we want to accomplish unconventional warfare effects in the arenas of political warfare, economic warfare and resistance.

LTC Cumpston: as a senior intel officer of an armored division, to increase complexity for our adversary means we need to increase interoperability with our own U.S. general purpose forces (GPF). This will allow us to increase effects in our missions.

     Internal interoperability:  Intel sharing, data sharing, how we communicate together, train together. We all need to understand what SOF brings to bear on a problem set, and what GPF brings to bear. There is much room for improving these relationships and thereby increasing understanding and awareness and interoperability. This is not a formalized process. We have a lot of room to grow in order to work towards better incorporating SOF in the fight and multiplying the effects we can achieving by doing so.

Collins:  When we are in competition phase (short of conflict), what are some ways we can increase complexity for our adversaries?

Cumpston:  Intel sharing needs to be improved and would set the stage for success when we move toward conflict. Second, by demonstrating interoperability to the adversary by training exercises – and messaging these to the adversary.  Specifically, would ask for exercise illuminating how SOF’s specific capabilities can enhance some of the capabilities we have here at Fort Bliss.

Dr. Kilkullin:  Complexity is a subset of man sets of costs to the adversary. We want to impose costs on the enemy in time, space, material, and reputation.

     Time -- SOF can throw a campaign off tempo, cause an adversary to take longer to do things, mapping the adversary target set and publishing it can slow down the adversary.

      Space --  SOF can pose a distributed threat far and wide, operate in a diffused space, so that the enemy has to defend everywhere. SOF is agile and can operate this way.

      Material  --  forcing the adversary to plan for more material losses. Imposing continuous costs on the adversary. Every little cost counts.

     Reputation  --  Russia / Ukraine, and China / Taiwan  -- they seek to intimidate the smaller nations by creating the illusion that they (Russia / China)  are invulnerable. By showing the world that they are not untouchable, we discredit this illusion and harm their reputation in a way that translates into actual physical victories.

     Keep in mind that we need to create these effects across both military and non-military capabilities. Very Important -- we have to understand the reaction parameters of the adversary, where they will react, what form, what duration, by what authorities, etc. We must predict the adversary response as much as we can in order to gauge the correct activity.

     We also need to free ourselves from the tyranny of the CONOP. We need to deploy smaller teams, with diverse skill sets. We need more agility. We need to sustain a virtual persistent presence, reach back and reach forward capability. Our own GPF also needs to be more involved, train with them more, as well as more agencies need to get involved – working toward more whole of government solutions. It’s not just a military problem.

Collins:  what is impeding us from being able to do these things?

Kilkullin:  We need to improve our physical and mental capacity to do them. Risk aversion by politicians who have become used to a very certain kind of mission set for SOF. We need to let them know what else we can do, we need to be the gray zone threat, and we need to explain to politicians what this means and how we can contribute.

Mr. Cloutier: The best focus here is:  Monograph of 4^th Age of SOF: Use and Utility of Special operations in a New Age, by Will Irwin and Isaiah Wilson, JSOU President. Find here in the Forum webpage as a rea ahead. This monograph explains how we can create complexity. Focus on Illegal and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF). Complexity theory – agents at one level are building blocks for agents at the next level; networks include many agents gathering information who are learning and acting in parallel and in an environment produced by the activities of these agents; system co-evolves with its environment; future is emergent and always unfolding; hard to predict future.  Greatest implication of complexity is in rethinking our mindset to solve our problems.

     Butterfly Effect: 1978 theory. Butterfly does cause the tornado because, controlled for all other environmental conditions, the tornado would not have happened if the butterfly had not flapped its wings.

     How do we apply complexity theory to our operations:  Probe, sense, adjust. Do an action, observe changes, observe new starting position, do another action, observe again. We are observing whether we are moving in the right direction, rather than doing a single activity and expecting a single response or output, which is too simplified of thinking and planning for a complex environment.

     Monograph agrees with this, as it recommends by, with and through operations, and population centric operations in order to “attack the adversaries strategy rather than his army”.  Invisibly adjust the rheostat – for IUUF – work through indigenous people to affect the government and thereby effect China’s ability to fish illegally.

Question:  What are some ways to improve efficiency and effectiveness at defining assumed adversarial doctrine versus actual doctrine?

Cumpston:  What we assume has been adversarial doctrine versus what has played out on the battlefield, has indeed highlighted our mistaken assumptions. Can we collect intel as evidence to support actual adversary doctrine, or to show what is inaccurate in their published doctrine?  This may help.

Question:  Do you hold to strategic paralysis theory? If so, how does SOF contribute and how was this evident in 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd ages of SOF?

Kilkullin:  There are examples from the 1^st World War, and Shock and Awe is another general example. 2 distinct modes of strategic paralysis - - 1) closing a lethal threat to an adversary commander (for the adversary to know that their commander is being hunted, might cause them to act irrationally, and make mistakes, this is why Russia is sending kill teams to go after Ukrainian leadership);  2) posing a bandwidth challenge for adversary’s decision makers

Question:  In this 4^th age of SOF, what emphasis should we put on deterrence versus preparation for the big fight?

Maher:  Use accumulative strategy rather than sequential strategy. We have to engage on as many levels and in as many places as possible in order to create complexity. Do a bunch of things in a bunch of places at the same time to create a strategic problem for the adversary. We can do message this capability via exercises and overt messaging and also right in our doctrine.

Kilkullin:  We just experienced a major failure of strategic deterrence – in Ukraine. We did not deter Russia in Ukraine. We see deterrence in a vertical escalation, but SOF can support deterrence in a horizontal direction (if you were to hold assets at risk in El Salvador, you might cause nuclear deterrence in Russia, etc).

Collins:  What might we have better to deter Russia in Ukraine?

Kilkullin:  We had a tripwire of allies and partners and infrastructure in Ukraine for years. When threat increased, we pulled our people out!  This was the opposite that we should have done. We indicated that we were going to leave and emboldened the adversary Russia.

Cumpston:  There is an information component as well. The administration released de-classified information in order to claim the narrative. Could we have employed that strategy further left in the timeline? Would this help? Would it have given more time for Russian leadership to change their calculus?

Collins:  Should we have combat observers on the ground in Ukraine?

Cumpston:  The benefit of having combat observers on the ground is gaining truth. They can help the military get better insight as to how well they are actually doing, and what they need to work on.

Kilkullin:  We should not have combat observers on the ground now. If we had them before the invasion, they may have actually served as a deterrent, but putting them in now would be too dangerous.

Collins:  What do we need to do in training and education to better prepare us for complexity against the adversary?

Kilkullin:  Smaller teams, operating at distance, design, using autonomous systems underwater, air, etc., air-ground integration, space is now a warfighting domain, support to resistance movements.

Panel 4: Understanding and Countering Irregular Adversaries What is ‘irregular warfare,’ and how can SOF conduct, and prevent against, IW in the future? Moderator: MAJ Kyle Atwell Panel: Dr. Jake Shapiro, Dr. Seth Jones, LTC Katie Crombe, and LTG Ken Tovo Day 1, 29 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Show Notes:

Question:  What is Irregular Warfare (IrW), and how can SOF conduct and prevent against IrW in the future?

Moderator:  MAJ Kyle Atwell:  Chair Irregular Warfare Initiative, Podcast host IrW Podcast

Panelists:

LTC Katie Crombe:  Army Strategist, SOCCENT, J5

Dr. Seth Jones: Sr. Vice President CSIS, Author:  3 Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare

Dr. Jake Shapiro: Professor Princeton University, Coauthor: Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict

LTG (Ret) Ken Tovo:  U.S. Special Forces, former CDR USASOC

Question:  Definition of irregular warfare, and how it is distinct from regular warfare.

Dr. Jones: IrW components:  activities short of conventional warfare, designed to expand a nation’s legitimacy and at the same time weaken the adversaries power / legitimacy, eg:  psychological ops, disinformation, misinformation, cyber ops, support to state and non-state actors, information warfare, economic coercion.

     Undermine adversary without direct action.  Regular warfare uses direct action mainly.

     Understand that our adversaries have similar concepts, but speak about this topic differently, for instance:  Russians say:  “active measures” Iran says:  “soft war”  Chinese:  refers to “3 warfares”, and supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy with indirect action

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  DoD definition:  violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.

     Conventional and IrW are seeking the same ends, we are just going about it in different ways.

LTC Crombe:  How are our adversaries leveraging IrW?  IrW is a thing that is about people.

     Iran:  gets in with their proxies at all levels, not just militarily, but also at the familial level, economic, etc.  How can we ensure that Iran doesn’t hold so much leverage in places like Lebanon, Iraq?  We need to get deeper into the villages again, like in Iraq. Where we have been fighting ISIS in Iraq, we have not been staying in touch at the tribal level, but Iran has.

Dr. Shapiro:  Compare IrW challenges we have now to those over the last 20 years? Over the last 20 years, we have known exactly where to invest our resources, in the Middle East. Now, where should we be investing our IrW efforts, when we are considering a global “battle” field? 

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  From your vast experience, what common threads related to IrW, do you find among all your experiences? To help frame the issue.  These conflicts are ASYMMETRIC, or chosen by the side without means to fight, because it is the best way for them to fight. Sometimes, the U.S. actually chooses this way as well, due to restrictions like lack of access. But sometimes, IrW is preferable, it is generally an asymmetric approach chosen by someone who has less means, or one of the parties is self-limiting for some reason.

LTC Crombe:  Patience – we have to communicate to our decision makers for instance in Congress, that the nature of IrW is that it takes time. For instance Ukraine – it is not what we are doing now in the Ukraine that makes a difference (it is still good to pump weapons and training into the fight now), but the decades of SOF work we have invested into that country prior to this conflict, that has really made a difference.

LTG (Ret) Atwell:  Agree – 3 Ps -- Patience, Persistence, Presence, and these things require strategic commitment.

     On Great Power Competition:  this strategy is expensive. See the UK, which won 2 long great power competitions – WWI and WW2. And even though they won them, they came out having lost their empire. So, even the winners lose in GPC.

Dr. Jones:  We must prepare for engagements that require IrW. As the NDS shifted our focus, and the shiny effort moved toward major conventional type war with China or Russia, we have engaged in a lot of wargames and investments in these areas. However, we additionally need to focus on the IRREGULAR aspects of these competitions.

     Eg: Building capabilities of the Taiwanese to fight against China, and planning for any other short of war responses we need to have ready for China (and other adversaries)

Question:  How about the Middle East?  Are we okay in these places, or do we need to do more, now that we are turned away from prioritizing CT?

Dr. Jones:   Investments matter. We should be investing much more in understanding the adversary, for instance reading Chinese books and translating so that we can understand.

MAJ Atwell:  So we have framed the conversation, framed the character of the threat and explained how prominent it might be in the future. How can SOF engage with these IrW challenges in the future?

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  Our approach can make a difference, as we have seen in Ukraine for example. IF the partner has a desire to help themselves, we can help them. If unwilling, we will not be successful. Ukraine was interested in learning and taking on the responsibility, and now they are demonstrating their abilities on the battlefield. Going forward, I see a partner focused role for SOF.

MAJ Atwell:  Interesting – most people view the conflict in Ukraine as evidence that IrW is dead, and future wars are going to be conventional. As you just highlighted, it is the decades of work SOF has done in the Ukraine prior to the war, that has paid dividends.

Role of information / disinformation in Ukrainian conflict.

Partnerships, SOLOs (Special Ops Liaison Officers), Interagency, Embassy relationships, etc. needed to prime the environment. SOF is the best tool for keeping a small posture inside nations, keeping a finger on the information ops context, staying in touch with the society, etc.

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  Warfare is a cognitive struggle. It is convincing the adversary that he has lost the struggle. We have to convince our own population that the struggle is worth it, and to the adversary population as well. Not just convincing governments, but populations, these days.

Dr. Shapiro:  What was interesting about Ukraine was that Russia ran out of weapons. Can you imagine the U.S. going into a fight and not having enough weapons or ammunition?

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  Yes, this is interesting, and reinforces the earlier discussion on how we need to prioritize our ability to understand our adversaries. Until we can better understand China, how they make decisions, how they see the world and themselves, we cannot create effective strategy. We should not be surprised by the decisions that our adversaries make. Are we surprised by Putin’s decisions in Ukraine?  Why are we surprised? Do we understand him? Do we understand all the aspects of Russian culture, how its government works, how Putin thinks?

Question:  Where should SOF be focusing? What are some areas that are NOT the correct focus for SOF?

Dr. Jones:  We should be focusing anywhere the Wagner Group is focusing? Wherever the One Belt ad One Road is expanding, anywhere where our adversaries are expanding – Africa, Indo-pacific, ports, maritime areas.

     No advantage:    for conventional warfare, only support

     Best advantages:  GRU, PLA subversive activities, Quds Force, building resistance activities in E. Europe and Baltic States, deterrence in the capacity to resist in case of invasion – SA and FID.

LTC Crombe:  COIN, CT, MISO, do what we do best, and do it EVERYWHERE. So, we don’t want to engage Russia in the Ukraine, where else in the world are there Russian forces – let’s engage them there. View is global.

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  Strategic Competition is not a strategy – it is an environment. SOF has a good mix of capabilities across USSOCOM. They will be needed in the future. SOF exists to solve hard problems and to create hard problems for our adversaries. We ca start by thinking about how we can create hard problems for our adversaries.

MAJ Atwell:  GWOT Era, SOF has been seen as a direct action force. Where do we need to make changes – what to keep and what to divest?

LTG (Ret) Tovo:  Partnerships have worked. ISOF in Iraq was the last standing bastion when ISIS came to town in Iraq. ISOF was a decades old partnership, and it made a difference. It wasn’t enough, but it made a difference.

     Partnerships are a good place to start going forward. They will never be regretted.

     Until we have a better strategy, I wouldn’t get rid of anything.

     May want to invest more in information operations.

LTC Crombe:  Same question.  Need for education going forward. Particularly educating ourselves on China – we need to study in China, we need to be able to read Chinese texts, understand their culture, etc. China sends its people here to study, and they understand us well. We need to do the same.

Dr. Jones:  Strategic construct is necessary, agree w/ Ken. We aren’t quite there when it comes to strategy, and this is really important.

     The competition will be global, and similar to Cold War.  There will be a lot of disinformation and misinformation. And looking at force posture, SOF can help locate, underwater drones, undercover people and forces, and other capabilities. Where adversaries might try to hide capabilities, including in the space and cyber domains, SOF can find a niche going forward.

Question:  What are the implications of this conversation for policymakers?

Dr. Shapiro:  We put a lot of money into DoD, and this is at the expense of our energy sector, our infrastructure, etc. SOF is a cheaper option than general purpose forces. SOF can offer solutions that decrease defense spending. This is an opportunity for SOF.

MAJ Atwell:  Sometimes SOF and Conventional forces compete with each other to present solutions to policymakers. Seth, do you see this at all in Washington?

Dr. Jones:  SOF is still seen as a direct action force. There MUST be a continued education campaign to make policymakers understand that SOF has an indirect action capability. We have significant expertise in indirect action, and we really need to show this.

May 17, 2022 Panel 5: What is a “SOF Professional”? What makes a “profession,” and how are SOF professionals unique and distinct? Moderator: LTC Mike Kelvington Panel:LTC Ken Segelhorst, Mayor James Gagliano, Dr. Kari Thyne, and SGM Timo Braese (German SOF) Day 2, 30 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Show Notes:

Question:  What is a “SOF professional”?  What makes a “profession”, and how are SOF professionals unique and distinct?

Moderator: LTC Mike Kelvington:  Princeton graduate, Army Ranger, Professor Military Science at Ohio University. 

     What is a professional?  Accept the responsibility to be stuards of the people and resources entrusted to them by society and to advance the state of their profession in anticipation of changes to the world around them. Mission is more important than the individual. (Army definition).

     Lessons gathered though not yet learned, from 4^th Age of SOF Monograph – bend conflict curve downward and extend the space between conflicts – this is our overarching goal.

Panelists:

LTC Ken Sengelhorst:  Army SOF Officer, Ethics and Leadership expert at Westpoint

Mayor James Gagliano:  law enforcement analyst, CT, Westpoint graduate, former infantry officer, MA Homeland Security

Dr. Kari Thyne: USAF Officer retired, munitions and mechanics, Pentagon Air Staff, Joint Staff, RAND Strategy and Doctrine, Ethics Instructor various, JSOU Ethics and Leadership expert

SGM Timo Braese:  German Army, SOF Ops SGM, now at WestPoint

Sengelhorst:  What ways can commissioning agencies better prepare future SOF leaders? We try to develop officers in 4 areas of expertise, including moral and ethical. When we commission them, we are certifying them as “professionals” – character, competence, and commitment. Character is most important, we can’t teach it, we have courses for competence, but not much for character. We have to focus on character, by giving these officers leadership positions so they can gain leadership experience and build character, because it is hard to train on character. For SOF, this is particularly important.

Kelvington:  “Team of Teams”, General McChrystal. What is going on at WestPoint in regards to moral / ethical, and critical and creative thinking so they can be successful on the battle field.

Sengelhorst:  Liberal Arts education at WestPoint serves these efforts. In the past 20 years, we have been able to use some of this education to real world problems, such as the things that have happened in D.C. during and after the elections. We focus on complexity and critical thinking to challenge their thinking. We focus on Commander’s intent, empowering your team, and decisive decision making. SOF is known to be better at these tasks, because they have historically had to operate with little support and in denied environments.

Gagliano:  What can you advise?  And especially how can we continue to serve after the military?  Was in FBI Hostage Rescue Team, doing hostage rescue in U.S., which is same as SOF Hostage Rescue mission OCONUS. In FBI, CT effort is important, and works w/ military and SOF. FBI does interrogations, interviews, fingerprinting, DNA testing, and law enforcement skill sets as well as tactical skill sets such as jumping, etc. There is much available for SOF operators once separated in FBI and law enforcement.

     Finding purpose after transition from professional SOF / military:  You may not ever find the bond of brothers that you have in your SOF teams, but in law enforcement / FBI, you will find the closest thing to it that you can find.  Mission and challenge will also be a part of these fields, which lends to purpose as well.

Thyne:  SOF Ethical Considerations Project – General Clarke and Chief Smith released the Comprehensive Review. My team decided to make a contribution to the solution of the problems in the Review. So:

     Professions seek to earn and keep the trust of the communities they serve – do so by establishing an ethos or system of values. What are SOF values / what is the SOF ethos?  We found the answers in the ancient Greeks, Plato, Aristotle, and Renaissance, Machiavelli, then John Locke 17^th Century England. What are the characteristics of human nature?  One is that we all are subject to moral drift.  Concept of human nature, leads to moral drift, leads to moral injury.

     New finding: extended moral injury, ongoing moral injury, repeated moral injury leads to higher  likelihood of suicidal ideation.

     Findings:  4 Quadrants:  Moral Drift + High Instance of Mission Success  --  when you have a culture where you are encouraged to disregard morals and values, then you have a real problem. So, do we have such a culture?  Does SOF encourage moral drift?  Does SOF look the other way, and even expect and even demand its professionals to disregard moral and ethical standards?  Not necessarily, but these are the questions we address.

Kelvington:  At WestPoint, accountability is a big focus. Vignette – Ranger training for of ethics:  RASP 1 and 2 are required as assessments before moving through promotions, includes psych evals, boards with senior leaders, etc. Helps raise red flags and eliminate people, as well as identify people who may need help, but we want to keep them in the organization – focus is both physical fitness and mental / moral fitness.

Thyne:  We have found:   Selection processes in place are actually selecting the right people. But the SOF environment is unique in particular because it makes ethical demands on its people that others services do not. For instance, we tach children that we win and lose graciously – do we reinforce such values in SOF? We do not lose wars graciously . . . .

     Other things are the team dynamics. SOF is comfortable critiquing each other on absolutely everything, except moral drift. These are uncomfortable conversations, but we have to get to the place where this is a normal critique, like anything else. It is part of looking after each other.

Kelvington:  Trust is definitely a big part of this. We need to be able to trust each other, that we can ask for help, and that we are all here to make each other better.

     Also, we in the military come from all different types of places and cultures. We have to be able to create a shared culture and also one of trust. This is a tall order for leaders, but an ethical baseline is definitely the best place to start.

Braese:  with the 75^th Ranger Regiment right now. Considering international relations, NATO, German-US relations, etc., understanding and communications is key. Critical thinking is also key, especially when practiced together among nations, and for SOF, the level of critical thinking is unbounded. Joint training missions are the best way to build international culture, ethical baseline – training is our best tool to get there together as ally, partner and friendly nations.

Kelvington:  Thank you – it is true communication is such an issue. It often causes frustration, also when considering information sharing and technology systems issues. How have you overcome some of the challenges you spoke about, like the haves and have nots issue and other bureaucratic road blocks.

Braese:  In German Army, we do what has to be done to get the mission done. Sometimes we have to do questionable things, or disregard bureaucratic road blocks when they are just complicated for no reason. Not saying we do things that are illegal, but some of the things we are made to do are just senseless, and we disregard.

Kelvington:  Great comments. I remember when serving on the task force, the issue was always intel sharing. The intel was useless when we were the only ones who could use it. We needed to share it with partners and weren’t allowed to. We were always having to find ways around this problem.

Question:  Considering 4^th Age of SOF, what education priorities would you recommend we focus on for short and mid-term?

Thyne:  JSOU is revamping our curriculum:  5 new focus areas -- SOF Leadership and Ethics, Integrative Campaigning, Resistance and Resilience, Information Advantage, Itelligence and Technology

Sengelhorst:  from WestPoint perspective, Geocultural / Political focus is key for us. There is an unprecented complexity in battlefield, hybrid threats, below threshold of armed conflict. We are short on language and culture expertise, and we need it for all cultures and nations. We need to better understand the operating environment much better.

Question:  How do you get senior leaders to relate to junior leaders in order to make the needed changes, when their experiences are much different?  How do you effectively pass the baton?

Kelvington:  Yes. We cannot disregard the junior leaders’ GWOT experience. Even though we have pivoted our focus away from CT, these officers have definitely led complex operations, and are as relevant as anyone who experienced the Cold War of the 90s.

Sengelhorst:  I would say that this is less of an issue for SOF than the general forces. We are much more adaptive and agile and better poised to avoid issues like this. But I do understand that this is going to be an issue for the larger forces.

May 18, 2022 Panel 6: SOF Education, Authorities, Doctrine, Special Challenges What adjustments to education, authorities, and doctrine need to be made to help SOF overcome the special challenges of the future? Moderator: COL Patrick Howell LTC Keith Carter Panel: Lt. Col. Timothy Heck, LTC (Ret) Cris Simon, and CPT Moriamo Sulaiman Day 2, 30 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

What is SOF’s role in establishing/maintaining partnerships and alliances, and what should those relationships look like in the future? Moderator: Dr. Rob Burrell Panel: COL Jaroslaw Jablonski (Polish SOF), BG Brett Chaloner (Austrailian SOF), and SFC Jarrid Johnson (US SF) Day 2, 30 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

What are “grey zone” operations, and what is SOF’s role in active campaigning in them? Moderator: COL Trevor Hough Panel: MG Joshua Rudd, Mr. Doug Jordan, LTC (Ret) Brian Babcock-Lumish and MAJ Kate Nelson Day 2, 30 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.

Dr. Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, JSOU President Day 2, 30 March 2022. Opinions in this forum are those of the presenters and may not necessarily be the views of U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University.